Abstract
Safeguards by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) play a pivotal role in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Over the years, the IAEA’s safeguards system has adapted to technological advancements and changing political landscapes, making it more resilient and flexible. This adaption is not only the result of programmes aiming at preparing and foreseeing future challenges in the nuclear field but also the result of several crises that have occurred over the last decades, including attempts to break non-proliferation commitments and limited access to facilities. The aim of this article is to explore what could be done in an event of unavoidable crises, with a focus on interim nuclear storage facilities where the continuity of knowledge is broken, and a quick and relatively reliable response is needed. We conducted a scenario-based workshop with multidisciplinary experts with different backgrounds working in the area of peace and conflict research. The workshop simulated three scenarios: (1) a terrorist occupation, (2) a flood, and (3) a mismatch of information following a coup d’état. This workshop revealed insights into crisis management strategies, data sampling, and the relevance of formal and informal interpersonal networks.